Journal of Social Computing
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 6

2021

From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A Moral Philosophy View
on Tech Ethics
Elettra Bietti
Harvard Law School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing

Recommended Citation
Bietti, Elettra (2021) "From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A Moral Philosophy View on Tech Ethics,"
Journal of Social Computing: Vol. 2: Iss. 3, Article 6.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23919/JSC.2021.0031
Available at: https://dc.tsinghuajournals.com/journal-of-social-computing/vol2/iss3/6

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Social Computing by an authorized editor of Tsinghua University
Press: Journals Publishing.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL COMPUTING
ISSN 2688-5255 05/06 pp266−283
Volume 2, Number 3, September 2021
DOI: 1 0 . 2 3 9 1 9 / J S C . 2 0 2 1 . 0 0 3 1

From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A Moral
Philosophy View on Tech Ethics
Elettra Bietti*
Abstract: Weaponized in support of deregulation and self-regulation, “ethics” is increasingly identified with
technology companies’ self-regulatory efforts and with shallow appearances of ethical behavior. So-called
“ethics washing” by tech companies is on the rise, prompting criticism and scrutiny from scholars and the tech
community. The author defines “ethics bashing” as the parallel tendency to trivialize ethics and moral
philosophy. Underlying these two attitudes are a few misunderstandings: (1) philosophy is understood in
opposition and as alternative to law, political representation, and social organizing; (2) philosophy and “ethics”
are perceived as formalistic, vulnerable to instrumentalization, and ontologically flawed; and (3) moral
reasoning is portrayed as mere “ivory tower” intellectualization of complex problems that need to be dealt with
through other methodologies. This article argues that the rhetoric of ethics and morality should not be
reductively instrumentalized, either by the industry in the form of “ethics washing”, or by scholars and policymakers in the form of “ethics bashing”. Grappling with the role of philosophy and ethics requires moving
beyond simplification and seeing ethics as a mode of inquiry that facilitates the evaluation of competing tech
policy strategies. We must resist reducing moral philosophy’s role and instead must celebrate its special worth
as a mode of knowledge-seeking and inquiry. Far from mandating self-regulation, moral philosophy facilitates
the scrutiny of various modes of regulation, situating them in legal, political, and economic contexts. Moral
philosophy indeed can explainin the relationship between technology and other worthy goals and can situate
technology within the human, the social, and the political.
Key words: ethics; technology; artificial intelligence; big tech; ethics washing; law; regulation; moral
philosophy; political philosophy
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Introduction

On May 26th, 2019, Google announced that it would put
in place an external advisory council for the responsible
development of AI, the Advanced Technology External
Advisory Council (ATEAC).[1] Following a petition
signed by 2556 Google workers demanding the removal
of one of the body’s board members, anti-LGBT
advocate Kay Coles James, the advisory body was
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withdrawn approximately one week after its
announcement.[2, 3] On December 3rd, 2020, Timnit
Gebru, a Google AI researcher, was abruptly fired for
sending an internal letter to Google employees which
discussed her superiors’ questionable resistance to the
publication of a research paper she co-authored.[4−6] Her
Tweet produced a wave of reactions in academia and
beyond, with many Google employees subsequently
quitting.[7] These episodes and the backlash they
produced provide a salient illustration of the tensions
around the corporate use of “ethics” language in
technology
circles.
Corporate
and
policy
instrumentalization and misuse of such language in
technology policy have taken two forms.
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On one hand, the term has been used by companies as
an acceptable façade that justifies deregulation, selfregulation or market driven governance, and is
increasingly identified with technology companies’ selfinterested adoption of appearances of ethical behavior.
Such growing instrumentalization of ethical language by
tech companies has been called “ethics washing”.[8]
Beyond AI ethics councils or AI Ethics researchers, the
ethics washing critique extends to corporate practices
that have tended to co-opt the value of ethical work: the
hiring of in-house moral philosophers who have little
power to shape internal company policies; the careful
selection of employees that will not question the status
quo; the focus on humane design—e.g., nudging users to
reduce time spent on apps—that does not address the
risks inherent in tech products themselves;[9] the funding
of “fair” machine learning systems combined to the
defunding of work on algorithmic systems that questions
the broader impacts of those systems on society.[10, 11]
On the other hand, the technology community’s
criticism and scrutiny of instances of ethics washing,
when imprecise, have sometimes bordered into the
opposite fallacy, which the author calls “ethics bashing”.
This is a tendency, common amongst non-philosophers,
to simplify the issues around tech “ethics” and “moral
philosophy” either by drawing a sharp distinction
between ethics and law and defining ethics as that which
operates in the absence of law[12] or by conflating all
forms of moral inquiry with routine politics, for instance
by merging or drawing artificial separations between
the frameworks of “ethics”, “justice”, and “political
action”.[13, 14] Distinguishing between “law” and “ethics”
is a common legal positivist move, configurable within
a long philosophical tradition that sees the practice of
making, interpreting, and applying law as processes
whose existence and relevance are distinct and separable
from their moral and societal implications.[15] The
relation between “ethics”, “justice”, and “political
action” instead is complex. Understanding ethics and
moral inquiry as either a mode of political action or a
discrete, individual-centric, and particularized exercise
that is easily instrumentalized and is unsuited to tackling
political and institutional questions is misleading yet
frequent. As described by Jacob Metcalf, Emanuel Moss,
and Danah Boyd, the distinction between narrow “ethics”
and capacious “justice” became a central focus of
discussions during the 2019 ACM Conference on
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Fairness, Accountability and Transparency.[13]
Equating serious engagement in moral argument with
the social and political dynamics within ethics boards or
understanding ethics as a methodological stance that is
antithetic to—instead of complementary to and inherent
in—serious engagement in law-making and democratic
decision-making, is a frequent and dangerous fallacy.
The misunderstandings underlying the broad trend of
ethics bashing are at least three-fold: (1) philosophy is
either confused with “self-interested politics” or
understood in opposition to law, justice, political
representation, and social organizing; (2) philosophy
and “ethics” are seen as a formalistic methodology,
vulnerable to instrumentalization and abuse, and thus
ontologically flawed; and (3) engagement in moral
philosophy is downplayed and portrayed as mere “ivory
tower” intellectualization of complex problems that
need to be dealt with through alternative and more
practical methodologies.
Grappling with the role of ethics in tech policy requires
moving beyond both ethics washing and ethics bashing
and seeing ethics as a mode of inquiry that informs work
in law, policy, and technological design alike in
emancipatory directions. Policy-makers, lawyers,
technologists, corporates, and academics do moral
theorizing all the time. Asking whether a corporate
ethics council can improve internal policy-making,
whether a given machine learning system can lead to
fairer criminal justice enforcement, or whether a given
corporate decision to fire a researcher or ban facial
recognition is acceptable in context involves asking
moral questions that, if properly framed, can lead to a
better understanding of these phenomena and also to
better policies. Awareness of the ubiquity of morality
would enable all actors in the technological and AI space
to contextualize their work with greater subtlety, at
several levels of abstraction, and to more rigorously
assess the legitimacy of corporate self-regulation and
other ethics initiatives.
One aim of this article is to distinguish between what
ethics is often thought to be (a neutral and contextindependent methodology, a self-interested corporate
rhetoric) and what ethics could be (a principled
methodology for evaluating political disagreements
around technology). To understand that distinction,
another distinction must be captured between the
intrinsic and the instrumental value of ethics. The
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intrinsic perspective sees ethics as a mode of inquiry
which is independently valuable as an aspirational
process, particularly for those engaging in it. The
instrumental perspective instead sees the value of ethics
as lying in its results. The value of ethics understood in
this way depends on its end-results, ethics’ causal role in
bringing about desired results, such as reputation,
innovation, and profit. Intrinsic and instrumental
perspectives on ethics and moral inquiry are not
mutually exclusive. One can understand ethics as an
intrinsically valuable process with valuable results.
However, distinguishing facial appearances of ethics
from approaches that emphasize ethics’ potential entails
emphasizing intrinsic value over instrumental value.
The author will argue that the more the process of
engaging in ethics is motivated by outcomes
independent of the process itself—the less ethics is taken
as an intrinsically valuable process—the weaker its
moral value becomes for society. Ethics washing and
ethics bashing are instrumental understandings of ethics,
in that both positions or tendencies envision or
experience ethics as a means to an end and nothing more.
What is at stake in recent controversies around the
weaponization of “ethics” rhetoric are also competing
moral conceptions of technology companies’ role.
Corporate-friendly conceptions benefit from inserting
ethical work within larger communications and public
relations strategies.[13, 16−18] Critical conceptions reject
these corporate efforts and prefer participatory
democracy and activism.[11, 19] Yet both corporations
and their critics obscure the potential role that moral
inquiry can and must play in developing a thicker
conception of technology politics. There is no neutral
perspective “outside morality” from which the
normative implications of technology can be teased out.
It should thus be possible to maintain a critical outlook
on the instrumentalization of ethics in technology
settings, while also recognizing the special value and
centrality of moral inquiry to expanding horizons.
This article has two goals. First, it aims to articulate the
weaknesses of both the ethics washing and ethics
bashing fallacies, explaining why both are impoverished
views of the relationship between technology and ethics.
Second, it aims to clarify the potential of moral
philosophy in debates about the impact of new
technologies on society and thereby to dissipate
misunderstandings of moral philosophy as either too
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abstract to inform concrete policy or as a red herring that
prevents proper focus on political and social action. Far
from constituting a barrier to appropriate governance,
moral philosophy enables us to seriously scrutinize the
future of technology governance, law, and policy, and to
understand what humans need from new technologies
and innovation from a unique vantage point.
The article is structured as follows. In Sections 2−4,
the article begins by explaining the function and
meaning of ethics and moral philosophy, some common
criticisms of moral philosophy, and what it is for. Section 5
of the article then provides background on the rise of
ethics in tech and the advent of so-called “ethics
washing”. In Section 6 it explains the limits of existing
critiques of ethics washing, identifying “ethics bashing”
as a fallacious depiction of ethics as opposed to law,
politics, or justice. In Sections 7 and 8, adopting a view
internal to moral philosophy, the author engages in a
moral argument and shows that commitment to moral
principles and engagement in moral reasoning also leads
to the conclusion that corporate ethics efforts are by and
large wrong and that ethics is antithetic to what happens
inside corporate settings. Finally, Section 9 of this article
suggests a way forward that moves beyond both ethics
washing and ethics bashing, that adopts a less
instrumentalist position on ethics, and that requires
developing governance frameworks that enable the
emergence of renewed moral, political, and legal
thinking and action outside corporate settings.

2

Ethics and Moral Philosophy

The English word “ethics” is derived from the ancient
Greek words ēthikós and êthos which refer to character
and moral nature.[20] Morality comes from the Latin
moralis which means manner, character, and proper
behavior. Both “ethics” and “morality” thus refer to the
study of good and bad character, appropriate behavior,
and virtue. The two terms are often employed
interchangeably but have slightly distinct uses and
connotations. Morality is often associated with etiquette
and rules of appropriate social behavior, whereas ethics
has instead a more personal connotation. Ethics pertains
to the cultivation of individual virtue abstracted from
society and is sometimes used to refer to personal and
professional standards of behavior embodied in “codes
of ethics”. In Confucian philosophy, morality is about
respecting the family and pursuing social harmony and

Elettra Bietti: From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A Moral Philosophy View on Tech Ethics

stability through virtues including altruism, loyalty,
and piety.[21]
In the discussion to follow, the term “ethics” will refer
to the rhetoric of morality employed in technology
circles, and “moral philosophy” will instead refer to the
philosophical discipline that investigates questions
around human agency, freedom, responsibility, blame,
and the relationships between individuals, amongst
other questions. The author adopts a primarily AngloAmerican liberal approach to the practice and
understanding of moral philosophy[22] but the author’s
perspective is by no means intended to close the door to
alternative approaches to moral philosophy and ethics.
According to some accounts, moral philosophy’s scope
is limited to relationships between humans and ethics
extends instead beyond humans to animals and nature.
Some would also distinguish moral from political
philosophy while others such as Ronald Dworkin see
them as interconnected.[23] Like Ronald Dworkin, the
author construes the “moral” widely as consisting of the
domain of “value”, i.e., an evaluative mode of inquiry
which is distinguishable from scientific or descriptive
modes of inquiry, which focus on facts.[23, 24] The
domain of “value” is the specific domain of inquiry of
moral philosophers.
To better illustrate what moral philosophy is, consider
the example of surveillance. Let us ask: what is wrong
or unethical about big data and certain forms of
surveillance? Disparate arguments can be offered to
show that big data and surveillance are wrong in some
respects or worth carrying out in other respects.
Different persons will likely have different views on
which of these arguments are strongest. As philosophers
might put it: the morality of surveillance is an evaluative
matter, i.e., a matter on which reasonable people
disagree because they hold competing moral
interpretations of what is at stake. Numerous lines of
reasoning support the wrongness of surveillance and
business models that rely on data extraction.
Surveillance is objectionable on self-development and
virtue ethics grounds because it incentivizes selfcensorship, reducing human beings’ ability to develop
themselves or to engage in other valuable causes for fear
that these actions will be held against them. Another
argument focuses on harm: some surveillance and big
data activities cause harm to individuals (e.g., they lead
to unjustified and stereotype-enhancing discriminatory
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treatment, they create asymmetries of knowledge and
power, they perpetuate pre-existing and unjustified
inequalities). A third line of reasoning focuses on equal
dignity and respect for persons: some forms of data
processing and surveillance fail to treat individuals as
equally worthy of respect because they are covert and
because some people are surveilled more than others.
Each line of argument entails a different way of
evaluating policy. For instance, if someone considers
that surveillance inhibits the pursuit of worthy behavior
or individuality, they might be satisfied with aspects of
big data and surveillance practices that enhance the
pursuit of certain worthy life goals, including certain
targeted and personalized work opportunities, as long as
they are empowering and equally distributed. On the
other hand, if one believes that the core problem is that
the data collected can cause unintended harm to
individuals, they might advocate for solutions that
minimize discriminatory impacts and ensure that harms
are reduced. Finally, someone who believes that
surveillance and the opacity of big data activities are
denials of respect for the persons surveilled might be
keen to ban surveillance completely or to reduce any
tolerable surveillance to a de minimis threshold.
Which reasons we find most weighty is a matter of
commitment and deliberation on how to actualize moral
values such as autonomy, equality, and human
flourishing. The process of weighing some reasons
against others allows us to overcome the intuitive belief
that “surveillance feels creepy”,[25] and to instead ground
or re-evaluate one’s commitment to privacy or its
limitation based on carefully weighed argument on how
different forms of surveillance and data extraction might
interact with autonomy, dignity, equality, and human
flourishing. Identifying the drawbacks of surveillance
business models and their morally unacceptable core
also facilitates the design of nuanced concrete strategies
for addressing them.
This process of revising and refining moral beliefs
through philosophical inquiry is what John Rawls
has called reflective equilibrium.[26] What Rawls’
methodology and other analogous modes of moral
evaluation have in common is that they provide a lens
through which to interpret issues of societal importance,
to locate them within existing debates, consider them
from all relevant standpoints, and evaluate which angle
or way of approaching them is capable of shedding the
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most valuable light on the issues themselves. When
engaging in this process, the broader the spectrum of
considerations that are taken into account in moral
theorizing, the more interesting, capacious, and morally
significant are the outcomes, and the more inspiring and
valuable are its practical implications.
It is also important to emphasize that moral philosophy
and ethics can mean different things as part of different
fields of study and intellectual traditions. The above is
intended to capture only a glimpse of a larger roadmap
of possible uses of the terminology of ethics and moral
philosophy in technology governance and policy. It is
not intended to fix the meaning of these rich and complex
modes of inquiry.

3

What Moral Philosophy Is For

A key question is what ethics and moral philosophy are
for and what they can contribute to existing technology
policy debates. In asking this question, The author
focuses on the reflexive value of engaging in moral
reasoning from the perspective of those engaging in it,
i.e., “from within”. In the technology policy context,
moral and other philosophical work is valuable in at least
four ways for those who pursue it.
First, philosophical reasoning and deliberation can
provide a meta-level perspective from which to consider
any disagreement relating to the governance of
technology. Instead of taking arguments narrowly,
intuitively, or personally, philosophical reasoning
provides a framework for stepping back, situating any
problem within its broader context and understanding it
within or in relation to other relevant or analogous
debates. As such, the practice or method of engaging in
moral argument allows us to broaden our perspective and
to look at a debate from a wider lens, overcoming
confusions, filling in gaps, correcting inconsistencies,
and drawing clarifying distinctions. In debates on the
acceptability or necessity of facial recognition
technologies, for instance, a philosophical method can
help us rethink our reasons for rejecting or promoting
existing technologies, clarify points of agreement
between a variety of opponents to these technologies,
and focus on where disagreements lie and what they
entail in practice: what freedom, equality, and human
flourishing require in an era of structural surveillance
and systemic inequality. Otherwise put, philosophy is a
good antidote to knee-jerk reactions: it can help reduce
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unbridgeable value conflicts and make agreement
possible by moving discussions between different levels
of specificity or abstraction. This is not to say that
ideology and value conflicts are unimportant, but merely
to recognize the importance of philosophy as a method
aimed at overcoming or clarifying those conflicts.
A second, related, contribution of moral philosophy to
tech debates is that it adds rigor principled thinking to
value-laden, emotional, or subjective discussions. Moral
philosophy should be understood as an explanatory
mode of inquiry which requires us to set out the
justifications and reasons for advancing one view and
not a different one. By centering attention on the
explanation and the justification for a position,
philosophy enables a dialectic to take place, a Socratic
dialogue which we can have internally with ourselves or
externally with others, that sheds light on blind spots and
enables fluid and iterative repositioning. Winning the
argument is not as important as laying all its facets on the
table. Such principled and disinterested inquiry is
frequently absent in technology policy and governance
discussions for at least two reasons. The first is that
current policy debates are instinctive, emotional,
polarizing and inimical to measured reflection. The
second is that many of these debates are mediated by
platforms whose corporate incentives are difficult
to align with disinterested reflection on societal
impacts.[27, 28]
Third, a normative philosophical lens can
substantively move us beyond a narrow focus on
procedural fairness, diversity, and representation in
technology governance, and towards substantive goal
evaluation. As explained in more detail below, the
problem is not just whether an AI ethics board’s
members have diverse perspectives and backgrounds,
but also whether the board’s decisions can actually
constrain Google’s profit-motivated actions. Similarly,
the question is not just whether a facial recognition
algorithm properly recognizes black faces, but whether
such algorithm is deployed in circumstances where it can
harm black people. A capacious moral philosophy
approach can help us move beyond checklists and
proceduralism to question whether an existing or future
structural governance framework and its substantive
outcomes are morally acceptable and worth pursuing.
Fourth, far from obscuring ideological conflicts and
structural divisions[19, 29] engaging in moral philosophy
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can facilitate dialogue, encourage the building of
common ground, and provide a basis for collaborative
and participatory approaches to policy-making capable
of bridging divides in a polarized landscape. An
important drawback of critical work that centers on
power, value conflicts, and unbridgeable ideological
divides is that it renders dialogue between people
holding different views or occupying different social
positions more difficult. Pursuing such strategies has its
advantages but it can also lead to fragmentation in an
already polarized and emotions-driven public sphere.
Understanding philosophy as a dialectic discipline that
enables empathy and grounds methodology in the
aspirational possibilities of commonality, justification,
and conflict resolution can instead help navigate
fragmentation and polarization today. The many
“embedded ethics” initiatives at computer science and
philosophy departments in the United States and beyond
are fostering greater debates and have been shown to
promote the building of common ground across
disciplinary boundaries.[30−33]
Still,
while
acknowledging
the
important
contributions of Western philosophy to the promotion of
an inclusive and discursive public sphere, awareness of
how power and inequality manifest within such
discursive public sphere is key. Not every person has the
same voice and the same ability to be heard.[34]
Equalizing a space in the face of structural inequality
must thus be one of the first considerations when
building spaces for dialogue and “ethical” reflection.
Contemporary approaches that embed ideology and
structural power asymmetries within normative
philosophical inquiry[19, 29, 35] account for the advantages of a discursive methodology while expanding
the horizon of philosophical inquiry to include issues of
structural inequality, power, domination, and
ideological entrenchment.

4

How to Criticize Ethics and Moral
Philosophy

Work in moral philosophy and ethics has a number of
limitations. Before turning to the rise of ethics discourse
in technology and the fallacies associated with that trend,
here are six ways of criticizing moral philosophy that are
targeted at moral philosophy as a reflexive exercise and
as a methodology. By addressing these important
criticisms, my aim is to shed light on moral philosophy
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as a critical method, showing that it can channel change,
re-assessment, and revision of commonly held beliefs.
First, philosophy can be criticized for being abstract
and for not being accessible to large audiences. This
makes philosophical work often unsuited to advocacy or
activism or to making provocative contributions to timesensitive issues. Philosophy is also rarely suited to opeds,
for example, or to those who aim at quick and easy policy
fixes. Yet depth and abstraction are also one of the
discipline’s advantages: engaging in philosophical work
prompts us to pause and think, to shield our thinking
from pragmatic pressures, to enlarge the temporal and
geographical scope of our research scope. As we engage
in this process, our intuitions change, we extend our
thoughts or revise them so that they can connect with and
make sense of other problems, we learn how to think
slower, to think with more depth and more
systematically. To achieve meaningful cultural and
social renewal in the technology industry, countering a
technological culture of fast-paced permissionless
innovation driven by an ethos of “move fast and break
things”, slowness needs to be taken more seriously.[36]
Second, some work in moral philosophy, particularly
in its connections with technology, is seen as not going
far enough prescriptively or as doing harm in practice.
Recent work in social science, for example, has
attempted to rely on the philosophical heuristic of the
trolley problem[37] to address the regulation of
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), with scarce practical
success and generating significant controversy. The
Moral Machines experiment at MIT,[38, 39] a large-scale
experiment that gamifies the trolley problem to
extrapolate aggregate data and then guidelines for
programming AVs, has been criticized for simplifying,
scaling, and misusing a case-specific and contextual
philosophical mode of reasoning.[40] Similarly, Basl and
Behrends argued that attempts at applying trolley
problem insights directly to AV policy are flawed
because they fail to take into account the complexity and
contextuality of machine learning development.[41]
More generally, entrenching high level principles for
ethical AI in Codes[42] also arguably remains too abstract
to guide individuals and policy-makers’ actions in
practice on AI questions.[11, 43, 44] In the absence of a
deep understanding of context, focusing on the trolley
problem or outlining high level theoretical principles
for ethical AI appears unlikely to lead to workable
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and morally compelling regulatory strategies. These
examples leave us perplexed: much philosophical work
seems irrelevant or unsuited to resolving pressing
problems in technological contexts. What is needed
however is not less philosophical work, but more
thinking on what moral principles can do in practice, and
what they mean contextually. Helen Nissenbaum’s work
on contextual privacy is an important example of how
thoroughly articulating the contextual implications of
abstract privacy norms can impactfully guide the work
of communities of practice.[45]
Third, the application of philosophical work can have
effects in practice that sometimes contradict the
philosopher’s motivations. Hegel and Nietzsche’s
philosophical ideas have been instrumentalized by the
German Nazi regime to pursue inhumane ends, an
instrumentalization that had little connection to what
these philosophers were actually doing or thinking.[46, 47]
More concretely, philosophers frequently understand
reflection and engagement with the politics and context
of their work as corrupting, and thereby fail to prevent
misuses of their ideas for unworthy ends. The hiring of
moral philosophers by technology companies is but one
instance in which philosophical ideas need to be
scrutinized in context; such work cannot be taken at face
value just because they are the ideas of a trained
philosopher. Philosophers are hired, and then their skills
are subordinated to the commercial goals of their
employers. In this way, work that might have seemed
apolitical in an academic setting acquires a new politics.
This work can become harmful if it hides under the
appearance of neutral thinking allowing the legitimation
of controversial states of affairs, such as the secrecy of
algorithms and their control by private companies. As
important as it is, this criticism however should not be
seen as fatal to the kind of work philosophers do.
The emergence of in-house philosophers means
philosophical work must be scrutinized with even
greater care, must be publicly accountable, and
philosophers must exercise an enhanced level of caution
regarding the context and consequences of what they do.
Importantly, the funding of philosophical work in the
technology and governance field must be disclosed and
discussed more openly.
Fourth, work in ethics can be understood as
normalizing, as an attempt to discipline social life by
devising and applying universally applicable norms of
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conduct that entrench existing power dynamics by
placing them outside the realm of contestation.[48]
Marxist critics of moral philosophy have also argued that
capitalist incentives can influence philosophical work in
directions that favor the interests of businesses and
elites.[49] Ethnographers speak of “ordinary ethics” as
the descriptive way ethics and morality structure routine
social interaction.[13] Zigon however emphasizes the
importance of distinguishing routine and unconscious
moral claims from conscious ethical claims that arise
during “breakdown” moments and are aimed at
changing a culture and at “returning to the unreflective
mode of everyday moral dispositions”.[50] While Zigon’s
anthropological perspective on morality and ethics
captures the pivotal role played by moments of
breakdown and moral dilemma, he still sees morality and
ethics as fundamentally about the need to return to
unreflected normality, to revise beliefs so they can be
fixed, routinized, and remain unchallenged once again.
For philosophers, instead, morality and ethics are
centrally about reflectiveness, conscious revising of
beliefs and constant changes to the status quo. Contrary
to anthropologists and ethnographers, moral
philosophers and ethicists are only marginally
concerned with the normalization of moral beliefs. For
a philosopher, the task is indeed to engage in direct moral
questioning about these beliefs and to bring them to the
foreground of our consciousness, instead of
emphasizing their regularities and embeddedness in
social norms and cultural contexts.
Fifth, philosophical theorizing is frequently criticized
for creating an appearance of principled reasoning,
neutrality, and objectivity when much of what is at play
are a philosopher’s subjective views.[19, 51] There is some
validity to this criticism, but it is less powerful than it first
appears. Good normative philosophical work does not
attempt to convey an appearance of absolute objectivity.
Quite the contrary, such work is very clear regarding the
uncertain bases on which it stands. A large share of
Anglo-American moral philosophy follows Rawls’
reflective equilibrium or a similar method, to
progressively match intuitions and beliefs to considered
judgments. This iterative process is one of many
approaches that Anglo-American philosophers use to
formulate normative conclusions. Although any
philosophical conclusion necessarily originates in a
thinker’s subjective intuitions and beliefs, it is also the
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product of structured and iterative revisions. It gives
conclusions a normative weight or subtlety that raw
intuitions do not have. Far from presenting ultimate and
final words on a subject, good philosophical work is
rigorous yet porous and open to scrutiny: its aim is to
broaden perspectives, allowing us to see the limits of the
existing and to constantly revise our beliefs.
Finally, sociologists have argued, often rightly, that
philosophy is not sufficiently from a gender and racial
perspective in particular, dominated instead by Western
male figures.[52]
These criticisms are grounded in the idea that moral
philosophy can be a worthy enterprise but that its
objective appearance or moral weight too often leads
philosophers in the wrong direction. Philosophers and
theorists interested in the potential of ethical reflection
in technology should not only be aware of these
vulnerabilities but must also combat them by embedding
inclusion and resistance to the exploitation and
instrumentalization of moral inquiry into their very
methodologies and practices.
As shown, moral philosophy is a reflexive pursuit that
is valuable as a process for those who engage in it in view
of making sense of the world around them with caution
and empathy. Moral philosophy in this sense is not a
synonym of the ethical initiatives that occur within
corporate settings which are mostly self-centered and
instrumental;[18] it is an exercise that, if construed
radically as an inclusive emancipatory methodology, is
in inherent tension with industry players’ profit logics.
In Section 5, the author explains the development and
rise of technology ethics and its entrenchment within
private companies, a trend often aimed at reputational
enhancement which has been called “ethics washing”.[8]

5

The Rise of Tech Ethics and Ethics Washing

In an important essay in 1980, Winner showed that
artifacts have politics in two important ways:
technologies embed and express the biases and power
relations of the society and people who design them, and
the deployment and use of these artifactual affordances
in turn change and shape the politics and power relations
in society.[53] The rise and promise of machine learning
and artificial intelligence technologies have brought
about a renewed urgency to the debate on the political
nature of technology and its ethical implications. A
number of prominent books and articles on the subject
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have shown that the deployment of artificial intelligence
can have significant consequences for privacy, human
dignity, equality and non-discrimination, gender, social,
racial, and economic justice.[54−61] The growing
awareness of AI’s societal implications and political
nature, and a significant “techlash”,[62] have led
companies involved in developing AI systems to pay
attention to the ethical implications of data science and
artificial intelligence.
In the last few years technology ethics has grown in
popularity and been adopted and endorsed in a multitude
of overlapping forms.[43] High-level statements of
principled artificial intelligence have been created
or endorsed by private companies, civil society,
governments, as well as transnational and multistakeholder entities.[42] Ethics training has been
developed and embedded in the computer science
curriculum of a growing number of universities.[30−32, 63]
The growing research field of AI and the growing body
of research around its ethical and societal implications
has led to the creation of a number of new conferences
and dedicated research institutes.[42]
Private companies have been involved in these efforts
at each level: developing and publicly sharing
statements of AI principles,[42] hiring in-house
ethicists,[64] forming ethics councils and bodies,[3] and
putting in place ethics and diversity trainings and
structures for their employees.[18] As regards principles,
Google, for instance, has published principles
emphasizing the need for AI applications to be socially
beneficial, to avoid creating or reinforcing bias, to be
safe and accountable.[65] Microsoft and IBM have also
engaged in codifying principles and procedures for safe
and trustworthy AI.[66, 67] Microsoft’s website states the
need to move beyond principles and toward
implementation of ethical AI through ad hoc internal
bodies:
We put our responsible AI principles into practice
through the Office of Responsible AI (ORA) and the AI,
Ethics, and Effects in Engineering and Research (Aether)
Committee. The Aether Committee advises our
leadership on the challenges and opportunities presented
by AI innovations. ORA sets our rules and governance
processes, working closely with teams across the
company to enable the effort.[67]
When they do not engage directly in crafting
statements of principles and setting up internal ethics
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boards, private companies sponsor AI conferences,
research institutes and efforts that shape the research
agenda and discourse around the societal impact of
AI.[68] The Partnership on AI, a non-profit established to
study and formulate best practices on AI technologies,
was founded by Amazon, Facebook, Google, DeepMind,
Microsoft, and IBM, and is entirely funded by industry
stakeholders. Palantir, Google, and Facebook frequently
fund major law, computer science, and privacy
conferences.[18, 43] In turn, AI ethics is becoming a
business, with consultancy firms and law firms
developing AI ethics expertise to assist tech companies
in their compliance efforts.[69, 70]
As these instances show, companies such as Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, and Palantir are concerned about
their ethical reputation in the face of new technological
developments in data science and beyond. Their efforts
to promote and arguably build more trustworthy and
ethical AI indicate a calculative stance, a method for
preempting financial and reputational risk, more than a
recognition of the political nature of AI and its
implications.[13, 14, 16] Even though it might be argued
that the intentions behind these initiatives are good, the
practices themselves are too limited and opportunistic to
be in line with a conception of morality and ethics
as reflexive capacious exercises that can foster
disinterested selfless change. Overall, speaking of
AI “ethics” instead of AI “politics” can be seen as a way
to depoliticize and normalize the impacts of company
efforts in this space,[14] allowing companies to “ethics
wash” their reputations and to narrow the space for real
debate and change in AI.[8, 71]

6

Critiques of Ethics Washing: Merits and
Limits

Efforts such as embedding ethicists or ethical guidelines
within industry practices and creating codes of ethical
principles aimed at more responsible and trustworthy
technological design have been criticized by scholars for
normalizing and depoliticizing data science and AI
(Green, this issue). They have been criticized for
bringing about a performative “transformation of ethics
and design into discourses about ethics and design”,[11]
a routinized checklist approach to ethics that is powered
by capitalist logics and a technosolutionist mindset.[13]
Companies are “learning to speak and perform ethics
rather than make the structural changes necessary to
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achieve the social values underpinning the ethical fault
lines that exist”.[13] For Greene, Hoffmann, and Stark,
these practices are both too focused on technical tweaks,
blinded by technical concerns about how to embed
fairness and accountability within machine learning
systems and neglectful of structural injustice, and are
universalist projects “justified by reference to a hazy
biological essentialism”.[11] For human rights experts
such as Paul Nemitz[12] and Phillip Alston who jokingly
said at a 2018 AI Now conference that he wanted to
“strangle ethics”,[13] technology ethics is seen as a
substitute or an alternative to more adequate human
rights laws.[16]
As argued further below, these critiques ought to be
taken seriously. They shed light on the politics of AI and
on crucial blind spots that are performatively and
voluntarily obscured by corporate ethics practices. Yet
they are at their weakest when, instead of understanding
that legal and technological governance are necessarily
embedded in ethical and moral thinking, they draw sharp
dichotomies between “ethics” and “law”, between
“ethics” and “justice”, as if these were incompatible
alternatives and they often misconstrue the relation
between “ethics” and “politics” failing to take them as
all ingredients playing complementary roles in a
desirable understanding of technology governance. The
author calls ethics bashing the reduction and dismissal
of ethics as a simplistic alternative to law or justice, and
the lazy conflation of moral thinking and inquiry with a
politics of neutral thinking and with appearances of
“ethics” that are hardly in line with what morality
requires. The author identifies three fallacies that
characterize ethics bashing positions.
First, Nemitz has drawn sharp distinctions between
ethics and law as separable and discrete practices: the
key question, writes Nemitz, is “which of the challenges
of AI can be safely and with good conscience left to
ethics, and which challenges of AI need to be addressed
by rules which are enforceable and based on democratic
process, thus laws”.[12] Such distinctions operate on the
positivist assumption that law—its making,
interpretation, and application—are institutional facts
whose existence and relevance are entirely distinct and
separable from its societal and moral implications.
Positivists, frequently relying on a Humean separation
of “is” and “ought”, or fact and value, argue that law
belongs to the realm of positive facts while morality is
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completely distinct and belongs to the realm of moral
value and of the “ought”.[72] An understanding of law as
conceptually separate from morality obscures how law
is constructed—written, interpreted, and applied—in
ways that embed certain moral and political
commitments. As Dworkin understood and theorized,
law has no factual existence other than the existence we
give it through the principled moral and political
commitments we express as we interpret and apply it.[24]
Consequently, the task of understanding, applying, and
re-making law is inseparable from engagement in the
internal reflexive exercise of moral commitment and
ethical evaluation. Instead of saying that law is superior
to ethics, we might want to respond to obtuse corporate
ethics efforts by saying that a capacious understanding
of morality and ethics is incompatible with ethics
washing and extensive self-regulation and that morality
instead requires effective laws and robust external
checks and accountability mechanisms on machine
learning systems, especially when they affect vulnerable
populations.[73]
The second and third fallacies, the conflation of
“ethics” and “self-interested politics” and the distinction
between “ethics” and “social justice”, are connected.
Both attitudes are grounded in a relatively narrow
understanding of moral inquiry as a discrete, individualcentric, and particularized exercise whose politics and
impact lie in its separateness from broader political and
institutional questions. As described by Metcalf et al.,
the distinction between narrow “ethics” and capacious
“justice” became a central focus of discussions during
the 2019 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability
and Transparency.[13] However, justice and morality are
inseparably intertwined. Critics are right to argue that the
focus on design and on embedding fairness in machine
learning is too narrow to address more urgent questions
around these technical systems’ political dimensions and
effects on structural inequality, capitalist exploitation,
surveillance, disinformation, and environmental
degradation.[10, 13, 14] However, responding to narrow
and techno-solutionist corporate approaches on “ethics”
is not exhaustively done by arguing somewhat
simplistically that justice is superior to ethics, whatever
that means, or that ethics has a flawed politics. It must
be done by showing that any meaningful understanding
of ethics (or politics) must include concerns about
structural inequality, capitalist extraction, and
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environmental justice, or else it is an empty exercise that
has little to do with the ethics, justice, and politics of new
technologies and their societal impacts.
The answer to instrumentalized ethics is not to draw
simplistic dichotomies, but to provide a richer account
of how ethics, politics, and law are connected and can
work together to enable a better understanding of AI’s
shortcomings and to foster political and other change.
By addressing ethics from the outside, as a discrete
practice that does not include them, critics of corporate
ethics often fail to recognize that ethics is something they
also engage in and that existing corporate practices are
in fact morally flawed. The task is therefore to change the
way we collectively engage in moral inquiry, equipping
ourselves with a better understanding of injustice,
inequality, and other digital harms. Corporate logics of
profit, expanding production, capitalist exploitation, and
so on are often incompatible with a capacious view of
morality.
In the remainder of this article, the author articulates
what the role of moral philosophy should be in
technology policy debates and how a view that takes the
reflexive internal exercise of moral inquiry as valuable
can shed light on the “ethics washing” debate. The author
then concludes with what ethics in technology must look
like going forward.

7

The Moral Limits of Corporate Ethics and
Self-Regulation

Equipped with a richer understanding of what ethics and
moral philosophy are and can do, the question now is
what role moral philosophy can play in informing
technology policy and particularly the question of what
makes ethics-based efforts as practiced in corporate tech
settings particularly problematic from a moral
philosophical perspective. Moral philosophy can
provide a lens to evaluate the moral wrongness of some
of these efforts.
As described above, companies such as Google, Apple,
Microsoft, OpenAI, Palantir, and Facebook are
increasingly making efforts to consider an ethical
standpoint. The intentions behind their proactive efforts
are often presented as good, but the practices remain
driven by market incentives and techno-centric
perspectives and motivated primarily by the need to
avoid financial and other company risk.[11, 13]
Notwithstanding good intentions, therefore, embedding
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philosophers or ethicists within technology companies
appears to be a façade that is frequently used to
legitimate certain pre-existing practices and to shield
companies from measures more protective of consumers.
This is true of corporate settings but also of public
institutions. Taylor and Dencik for example have
described the political dynamics within the European
Commission’s High Level Expert Group on AI, showing
that instead of having outcomes guided by processes
of reflection and philosophical principles, ethical
reflections are often designed to produce pre-determined
instrumental outcomes.[18] They state that after months
of discussion around “red lines” on the use of AI,
corporate participants in the High Level Group stated: “the
word ‘red lines’ cannot be in this document … at any
point … and the word ‘non-negotiable’ has to be out of
this document.”[18] As Taylor and Dencik point out, “if
the possibility of delineating meaningful boundaries for
technology … is off the table, then so is an important part
of the task of ethics.”[18]
As we assess these ethics initiatives, we are therefore
pulled in two directions. On one hand, we are tempted to
welcome some of these developments as positive. On the
other hand, we are moved to criticize these efforts for the
opportunism they represent. Where we stand on this
spectrum will often be informed by our situated
perspective, our training, by who pays us, etc. What
moral philosophy as a method enables us to do is to take
a step back, to consider these attitudes along a spectrum
of nuanced positions on companies’ ethical behavior,
and to evaluate our reasons for supporting or resisting
initiatives such as a corporate ethics council or an AI
Panel of Experts at EU level. It allows us to suspend our
intuitive reactions and take a less polarized perspective
on the question: What is wrong with the instrumentalization of ethics language? And what is wrong with
ethics boards and self-regulation?
As seen, much of the debate has centered on ethics
as a self-regulatory modality of governance and an
alternative to law and government regulation. As Javier
Ruiz is reported to have stated, “a lot of the data ethics
debate is really about how … we avoid regulation. It is
about saying this is too complex, regulation cannot
capture it, we cannot just tell people what to do because
we do not really know the detail.”[18] Self-regulation and
self-publicity at first both seem benign. Self-regulation
in certain cases is not only tolerable but actually
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welcome, for instance where regulatory interference by
a public agency is unlikely to be effective and where a
self-regulatory approach can lead to substantive policy
improvements for individuals and society. Further, in
principle it does not seem morally objectionable to fund
and develop initiatives that foster a positive image of one’s
business, nor does it seem wrong for a business to engage
in self-publicity and self-advocacy. However, when
looking further the reality is more complex.
To use an example, let us focus on the case of selfregulation in relation to online content moderation on
Facebook. In the United States, governmental regulation
of online speech is seen with suspicion.[74, 75] The
solution to the regulation of online speech on Facebook
has consequently materialized in the form of an internal
Facebook Oversight Board (FOB), a quasi-judicial body
set-up internally but composed of external experts to
adjudicate on the acceptability of controversial user
content on the platform.[76] The body has been praised
as “one of the most ambitious constitution-making
projects of the modern era”,[77] and is seen as a workable
and promising approach for taming Facebook’s power
over online content in the face of First Amendment
restrictions on government regulation.[78] Nonetheless,
while the Board may bring about needed transparency
and an appearance that content moderation is being
tackled fairly, we must look beyond Facebook’s
messaging to find its shortcomings, procedural and
otherwise. In spite of its carefully crafted set-up and the
well-intentioned messaging around its existence, it is
likely that the FOB will serve the interests of Facebook
more than those of users. First, it provides a way to shield
Facebook from other forms of regulation and scrutiny
on matters of content moderation and community
guidelines, including the intervention of national or
international courts but also the formulation and
enforcement of legislative redlines and constraints.
Second, by centering attention on content moderation
and community guidelines, it allows Facebook to
continue developing its News Feed algorithms as it
pleases, and to continue showing individuals lucrative
content, without interference from regulators or courts.
Thus, far from addressing all questions of online speech
harms, the FOB seems to divert attention toward some
issues and away from the most pressing concerns around
misinformation and political propaganda.[79]
The case of facial recognition technologies is
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analogous. In the United States, much state regulation of
private technology firms is made difficult by the
First Amendment.[80] The solution to making facial
recognition more ethical was thus for some time believed
to be something that must originate within the
proprietary walls of tech companies and not something
that can be initiated by government entities or the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). But things are
changing. Following activist efforts, companies like
IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft have scaled back on
their offering of general purpose facial recognition
software.[81, 82] More recently Facebook has declared
that it will cease to use facial recognition.[83] Earlier,
company ethics boards themselves, such as Axon’s,
recognized the importance of public oversight on these
technologies.[84] In spite of litigation by tech companies
to defend their self-regulatory immunities, it seems that
the nomination of Alvaro Bedoya to the FTC will mark
a turning point in the relationship between state power
and self-regulatory power in this space.
Self-regulatory and ethics washing initiatives such as
the FOB, Google’s ATEAC Board or Axon’s Report on
facial recognition technologies should prompt us to look
beyond appearances and ask whether their very
existence, in spite of appearing useful and a step forward,
might in fact performatively obscure more pressing
problems and risk long-term harm.

8

A Critique of Ethics Washing from Within
Moral Philosophy

To explore the moral limits of these internal corporate
efforts superficially aimed at developing more ethical
artificial intelligence, we must again turn to moral
philosophy. At least three moral arguments can be raised
against initiatives that co-opt ethics language and selfregulation for selfish corporate purposes that include
profits and reputation.
First, the type of ethics work carried out within
companies or ethics boards more often than not seems to
lack instrumental value: it does not have beneficial
effects on individuals and society, because it is
undertaken under conditions that deny these beneficial
effects. Second, these practices also seem to lack much
of the intrinsic, or independent, value associated with
philosophical inquiry insofar as they do not seem to be
undertaken in ways that value the process itself and with
the aim of achieving overall justice. Third, even if these
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ethics-based practices were carried out in absolute good
faith and in pursuit of justice, and thus maintained both
their instrumental and intrinsic value, instrumentalizing
ethics reasoning and language to reach company goals
entails a specific kind of epistemic concern. Indeed, it
seems that the performative role of ethics language
remains problematic even where, as the cases of the
Facebook Oversight Board or the Axon Ethics Board
have illustrated, these efforts are intended to address real
issues and in fact could have positive effects. This
happens where, in spite of having some instrumental
value, these efforts instrumentalize ethics for the sake of
other selfish or less valuable ends yet are presented as
panaceas that serve the public interest. In what follows
I explore these three arguments.
The first critique of self-regulation and company
ethics is an argument grounded in the poor instrumental
value, or small positive impact, of ethical work
performed within a company. Ethics bodies or in-house
philosophers are purportedly set up and hired to make a
difference to a company’s social impact. Yet as long as
philosophical inquiry is mandated and funded by a
company, and carried out within closed corporate
proprietary walls, its primary function is to benefit
companies and fulfill their pre-existing mandates, and
cannot be to benefit society at large and lead to social
renewal. Internal AI ethics practices are frequently put
in place for compliance purposes, to pre-empt
reputational and financial risk.[13] They are subjected to
internal limits, subordinated to the endorsement of high
management, and dependent on company funding. This
dependency on the company’s control renders ethics
rhetoric inadequate for addressing serious cases of
company misconduct and also unfit for achieving
societal change.
The narrow impact of ethics-based efforts carried out
within tech companies is due in part to formal limitations
on employee-philosophers’ or ethics boards’ mandates
and in part to more diffuse pressures that companies
exert on technological discourse and context. Formally,
for example, Apple’s philosopher in residence Joshua
Cohen has been forbidden from making public
appearances since he started working for the company
and Microsoft’s AI ethics board does not disclose the
reasons for its decisions.[85] The firing of former Google
employees Timnit Gebru and Margaret Mitchell for
writing allegedly controversial papers and pushing for
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a prosocial AI agenda inside the company illustrates
companies’ power to formally police internal ethics
efforts.[6, 7] It also however shows the potentially strong
instrumental value of social media backlash following
these episodes.[4] Less visibly, companies also exert
diffuse influence on the broader discourse around
technological innovation and ethics by funding research
and policy initiatives that favor their agendas and
selecting people to engage with (and whose ideas to
highlight), including the people these companies choose
to have as part of their ethics-based initiatives.[68, 86]
These internal pressures in turn shape the substance
and conservative nature of resulting ethics-based work.
Strong pushes for data protection guarantees, data
minimization mandates, redlines on the use of AI in
credit scoring, policing, criminal procedure, or antitrust
enforcement can hardly be initiated by a company’s
ethics board or in-house philosopher. Their role remains
confined to steering, reviewing, and advising on policies
and product launches within the confines of existing
business models, so as to preserve those business models.
For example, in June 2020, IBM publicly announced it
would stop offering general purpose facial recognition
or analysis software.[81] This move, which was a
significant departure from IBM’s long-standing position
on facial recognition and was followed by similar
announcements by Amazon and Microsoft, came as a
result of external political pressures in the wake of
George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis, not as a result of
the company’s internal ethical compliance processes.[82]
Yet it is precisely at moments of political and moral
breakdown, where a company’s activities and general
goals clearly come into conflict with the interests of
society, that ethics can acquire central importance[13] and
can provide a fruitful lens for evaluating and deciding the
way forward. In most cases, instead, the breakthrough
potential of ethics as a mechanism for learning from and
facing dilemmas and contradictions is missed. As long
as the ultimate decision-maker on any given AI policy is
the company itself, as long as internal ethics programs
are focused on rhetoric more than on substance, these
initiatives will keep benefiting the industry more than
users and their instrumental value for society is limited.
The second critique of so-called ethics washing looks
at the act of engaging in these efforts by philosophers-inresidence, or members of ethics boards, and examines
the intrinsic or independent value of these people’s
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engagement in moral thinking. Moral philosophy as a
practice has value when followed in pursuit of
independently valuable goals such as truth, justice, or the
well-being of society. To be intrinsically valuable,
engaging in moral argument must be done to a
substantial extent out of commitment to moral principle,
in the belief that it can lead to a better understanding of
moral questions. If instead it is undertaken for the sake
of earning money, pleasing employers, or obtaining
honors and recognitions, it loses some of its special
worth.
We might think that this critique is about the actual
motivations of the philosophers and experts that engage
in the exercise. When looking at cases of philosophersin-residence, ethics boards, or academics who work
closely with these companies, there are doubtless some
individuals who do it to raise their profile or create
connections that can lead to further work in the field, or
even to obtain promotions, honors, or greater impact and
salience for their work. Yet many also do it simply
because they believe that their involvement might lead
to a positive overall impact or in the hope of getting
insights into how the company works. It is tempting to
focus on these people’s intentions and blame their
shortsighted mindsets, but focusing on intentions seems
unhelpful: the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
To better characterize the independent value of ethicsbased work, we must look beyond intentions and instead
at scope: actual commitment to moral principle requires
questioning what an employer requires. Philosophical
thinking must have the potential to reach beyond the
limits imposed by companies in corporate settings. For
example, saying that a facial recognition algorithm
should be reviewed because it systematically identifies
white people more accurately than black people seems
right but is not sufficient. Rectifying bias requires more
than acknowledging that the algorithm needs “fixing”. It
requires making sure that the algorithm is not deployed
in settings where it might cause irreparable harm to black
people. It also possibly involves thinking about
preventing the use of such algorithms by the police, or
by society at large, and replacing them with human
decision-making.[10, 56] To the extent an ethics board or
in-house philosopher engages in moral argument with a
view to correcting the algorithm yet is prevented from
considering or voluntarily ignores these other
considerations, their moral inquiry seems to lack
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substantive independent value. Philosophical inquiry
achieves its full potential only when it comes with full
and unrestricted substantive commitment to moral
principle and justice.
Third and finally, even if these efforts did have
intrinsic and/or instrumental value, the expression
“ethics washing” denotes a particular epistemic function
of the activities in question which requires distinct
analysis. Ethics rhetoric, as it is funded and constructed
in academic and corporate circles, may have the effect
of freezing popular imagination and of preventing the
emergence of valuable alternatives.[68] It may promote
and reinforce a narrow and confined vision of the
possibilities for regulatory and societal change.
It can, for example, mislead the public into believing
that previously contested policies have now become
acceptable, thus creating a legitimacy buffer for
objectionable corporate action. Immunizing corporate
action from public scrutiny is dangerous for more than
one reason: apathy strengthens corporations and
weakens activists, it shifts the burden of policing new
technologies from deep-pocketed security and defense
departments and private companies to poorly funded
activist groups and other marginalized stakeholders. It
can also discredit awareness-enhancing efforts and
narrow the spectrum of contestation and debate. Selfregulatory efforts, such as the example of the FOB
provided above, tend to narrow the scope of a debate,
marginalizing questions of structural injustice or
disruptive change and instead centering attention on
procedural fairness and fixable tweaks. This—
predictably—ends up favoring incumbents. Although
the performative dimensions of ethics washing are
hardly visible by a majority of consumers, they are in fact
crucial to a comprehensive analysis of corporate and
governmental stakeholders’ strategies in this space and
of the moral value and acceptability of their efforts.
Overall, an analysis from the perspective of moral
philosophy confirms the view of many critics of ethics
washing efforts. It helps us see many of these in-house
ethics initiatives as lacking significant instrumental and
intrinsic value and also as playing a performative
function that can negatively affect persons. There are no
doubt exceptions of companies really working to ensure
that internal ethical work is independent and valuably
contributes to a more just society. However, in general
policymakers should not overlook the salience and
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weight of these critiques of ethics as a self-interested
rhetoric. Many existing internal efforts to construct a
corporate ethics, particularly around AI, largely remain
a façade.

9

Avoiding Ethics Bashing

If the reasons for criticizing and resisting ethics washing
are ones found within moral philosophy, where does this
leave us on the role of moral philosophy? How should
we understand corporate ethics? Two main fallacies
seem at play in overbroad critiques of ethics that see
ethics as distinct from law, politics, justice or social
organizing: a linguistic misunderstanding, that is to say
the conflation of instrumentalized ethics washing efforts
with moral philosophy as a reflexive exercise, and
ignorance of or resistance to the possibilities and
importance of moral philosophy as a discipline and
method.
The linguistic misunderstanding is due to what the
author has described above as companies’ cooptation of
the language and performative function of “ethics” to
pursue self-promotional goals. Instrumentalized and
emptied of its instrumental and intrinsic value, what
remains of “ethics” is an empty construct trapped
between meanings and signifying timid instances of selfregulation, static and finite lists of guiding principles,
and other forms of narrow and conservative regulative
“fixes”. None of these embodied instances of the
practice of ethics are actually likely to be fully morally
defensible, but as the word quickly gains traction, it gets
defended or criticized at face value by corporations and
critics alike. These dynamics further entrench the misuse
and instrumentalization of ethics language. In policy
circles, the word becomes a red herring, a mode of
governance or a communications strategy to dismiss.
Yet the misunderstanding at bottom is this: what is called
“ethics” may have nothing “ethical” in it. It may have no
intrinsic value for those who perform it and may have
instrumental value only for those who commission it and
not for society at large.
Much of the ink used to bash “ethics” was perhaps
justified but it could have been used more wisely by
distinguishing corporate ethics, or ethics washing, from
the practice of moral philosophy. We too frequently
neglect that “ethics” can and must encompass more than
what companies make of it: that properly contextualized,
ethics can be a valuable methodology for rethinking the
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competing or complementary merits of different kinds
of regulation, including self-regulation and other forms
of law and policy-making.
A richer critique of corporate self-regulatory efforts
therefore demands that we operate at two levels: be
critical of ethics washing, while also being aware that our
very critique positions ourselves distinctly within moral
philosophy. In other words, when criticizing certain
practices we necessarily adopt a distinct moral stance
that is within moral philosophy—not outside of it. We
must thus be ready to engage more thoroughly with the
flaws of narrow approaches to ethics and to accept that
defending more capacious ethical stances is related to a
better understanding and awareness of moral philosophy’s
potential—not a blank rejection of it as a language,
practice, discipline, and mode of inquiry. This requires
a deep societal reckoning with the values and limits of
moral philosophy.
To change tech ethics, it is urgent to rethink the way
technology ethics comes to exist and is talked about.
Since ethics washing is broadly antithetic to meaningful
and capacious ethics, it is important for policy change to
originate primarily outside formal and informal
corporate settings. To be effective, the role of
philosophers, boards, and other formalized bodies
concerned to bring about ethical AI must be re-imagined,
their scope of action and mandate must extend outside
the corporate walls of companies such as Google or IBM,
they cannot be exclusively or primarily funded by
companies such as Facebook or Palantir, they must to the
extent possible safeguard themselves from opportunistic
corporate discourse around “ethical AI”. A deep
reinvention of the structures, processes and modes of
governance through which technological impacts on
society are evaluated is urgent. At their core, these
processes must facilitate the moral evaluation,
questioning,
and
constant
re-assessment
of
technological developments. Far from treating
technological developments as moments of ethical
breakdown, technology as a whole must be seen as a
system that endemically tends toward societal
breakdown, and therefore requires constant reflexive
reconsideration, revision, and re-imagination.
Criticized as complex, abstract, apolitical, and
misleadingly neutral or objective, philosophy is
frequently dismissed in areas such as technology policy
which are fast moving, full of ideological conflicts, and
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in need of quick and effective responses. However, it is
clear that quick and effective fixes are not the answer.
Ideological conflicts and the pace of innovation are not
barriers to doing more impactful and valuable
philosophical work in this sector. Indeed, the current
technological zeitgeist of strong resistance to
surveillance capitalism; new data privacy laws; the
complicated relationship between big tech, big oil, and
climate justice; tech employee movements and
whistleblowing; COVID-19 and Black Lives Matter
suggests that something within technology is changing,
and that it is time we adopt new tools and modes of
thinking to fight technological injustice. What the tech
ecosystem is in greatest need of today, in fact, seems to
be a slower, richer, more comprehensive investigation
of what various technology companies and stakeholders
owe to humans, to animals, and to the planet. New
technologies are also making us reinvestigate and
question the commitments we humans owe to each other,
as well as to other beings and to the global planet
ecosystem. This is precisely what moral philosophy is
for. We may want to stop bashing it and instead invest in
re-imagining it.

10

Conclusion

This article has argued that ethics washing and ethics
bashing are both reductive tendencies that rely on a
limited understanding of what ethics actually entails.
Ethical reasoning or moral inquiry can have intrinsic
value as a process and instrumental value as a means to
the achievement of other valuable outcomes. The author
has argued that the more ethics is used in tech circles as
a performative façade and the more it is instrumentalized
and voided of its intrinsic reflexive value, the less value
ethics can have overall as a practice and mode of inquiry.
Adopting a perspective internal to moral philosophy
helps us see the limits and actual similarities of what
seem like polar opposites—ethics washing and ethics
bashing—as two instances of instrumentalized ethics
language.
The way to combat ethics washing, therefore, is not to
instrumentalize, reduce, and then dispose of ethical
language, but rather to distinguish performative and
instrumentalized forms of ethics from valuable
commitments to moral principle that promote
advancements in self-knowledge, understanding, and
social change. Although philosophers might never fully

Elettra Bietti: From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A Moral Philosophy View on Tech Ethics

adapt their methodology to fast-paced and politicized
technology environments, we cannot disregard the
immense depth and richness that philosophy can bring to
any debate, not least ones about technology governance.
We all ask moral questions as part of our daily pursuits.
Technology scholars and policymakers should embrace
moral philosophy and value its porous, principled, and
open-ended richness, yet resist its instrumentalization or
reduction to a performative ethics. Moral philosophers
should take on the difficult task of rethinking how new
technologies interact with humans so as to provide
answers to questions in urgent need of theorization. We
all ask moral questions as part of our daily pursuits. To
avoid falling into reductive epistemic and ideological
traps, it is everyone’s duty to nourish curiosity for ethics’
and moral philosophy’s role in tech and beyond.
However, before we can re-center attention on
technology ethics, value it in our daily pursuits, and
renew interest in the interconnections between moral
philosophy, justice, politics, and law, it is urgent to decenter the structures for engaging in theoretical and
ethical thinking from corporate settings. Making a
commitment to moral principle in technology is
impossible without a new governance framework that
ensures that ethics in technology remains independent
and capacious.
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